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ABSTRACT 
This paper investigates the role of targeting in the context of agri-environmental schemes 
involving monitoring and penalties and well suited to a geographically-based distinction 
between participants.  By separating participants into a target and a non-target group the 
aim of targeting is to reduce the moral hazard problem.  The paper analyses three 
approaches to targeting and the focus is on reducing the extent of cheating by participants 
in the non-target group.  By complementing the adoption of targeting with appropriate 
adjustments to the monitoring/penalty parameters it is shown how such an approach can 
exploit the risk aversion of participants to completely eliminate cheating by those 
participants in the non-target group.  3 
INTRODUCTION 
The issue of policy mechanism design has become popular in the recent literature relating 
to agri-environmental policy (Choe and Fraser, 1999; Hogan, Ozanne and Colman, 2000; 
Fraser,  2001;  Latacz-Lohmann,  1998;  Moxey,  White  and  Ozanne,  1999).  Both  the 
incentive-compatible  and  the  monitoring/penalties  approaches  have  featured  in  this 
literature (see Moxey  et al and  Latacz-Lohmann respectively).  However, in practical 
terms it is unlikely that the former approach will supplant the latter approach currently 
applied in agri-environmental policy contexts.  Moreover, as is often the case is relation 
to existing policy, current practice has a tendency to move ahead of the literature.
1 
 
A relevant example of this in the monitoring/penalties area of regulatory policy is the use 
of  “targeting”  as  a  device  for  enhancing  the  efficiency  of  the  resources  applied  to 
monitoring the implementation of a policy.  In this situation the monitoring authority will 
announce  in  advance  of  the  monitoring  process  commencing  that  a  sub-group  of 
participants will be “targeted” – implying that their probability of being monitored is 
higher than participants outside the sub-group. 
 
In  the  literature  research  has  been  reported  exploring  the  adjustment  of 
monitoring/penalty  parameters  to  improve  policy  effectiveness  (see,  for  example, 
Polinsky and Shavell, 1979), however little research appears to have been done in the area 
of targeting .  This may be because such targeting requires specific information about 
participants which in many situations is not available to the authorities, although it has 
been  used  in  the  context  of  income  taxation  by  choosing  the  target  group  based  on 
employment occupation (Australian Taxation Office, 2001). 
   4 
From  this  perspective  agri-environmental  policy  seems  particularly  well-suited  to  the 
application  of  targeting  as  agri-environmental  schemes  often  have  a  well-defined 
geographical basis (Fraser and Rygnestad, 1999), and so it should be straight forward to 
target participants based on geographical location.  Given this potential for applying the 
targeting approach to agri-environmental policy monitoring, the question arises as to the 
usefulness of this approach in alleviating the moral hazard problem in this context.  The 
aim of this paper is to investigate this question, with a particular focus on the behaviour 
of those participants in the non-target group. 
 
The  structure  of  the  paper  is  as  follows.    Section  1  develops  a  model  of  an  agent 
participating in an “agri-environmental “ policy which requires an action on the part of 
the agent subject to monitoring by the principal.  The agent receives   a payment for 
undertaking this action, which itself involves an income reduction.  Consequently, the 
opportunity  exists  for  the  agent  to  “cheat”  by  claiming  to  undertake  the  action,  but 
actually  not  do  so,  thereby  receiving  the  payment,  but  not  experiencing  the  income 
reduction associated with the action.  Therefore, a monitoring/penalties system is used by 
the principal in an attempt to prevent the loss of effectiveness of the policy brought about 
by such “cheating”.  It is into this specification that the additional monitoring feature of 
targeting  can  be  inserted,  and  its  potential  usefulness  investigated.    It  should  be 
emphasised at this point that an essential component of the targeting approach is repeated 
monitoring, whereby either the target group can be changed, or alternatively participants 
can be moved from the non-target group to the target group.  Therefore, in Section 1 the 
decision framework of the agent is specified with an inter-temporal format so as to enable 
the targeting feature to be introduced.    Within this framework three  versions of the 
targeting  approach  will  be  considered.    The  first  version  is  “resource-neutral”  in  that   5 
overall monitoring resources are unchanged with the introduction of targeting, and so an 
increase in the probability of detection in the target group is achieved by a reduction in 
the  resources  applied  to  detection  in  the  non-target  group,  thereby  decreasing  the 
probability of detection in this group.   The second version is “non-resource-neutral” in 
that overall monitoring resources are increased in order both to maintain the probability 
of detection in the non-target group at the level applying prior to the introduction of 
targeting, and to increase the probability of detection for those in the target group.  The 
third version restores “resource-neutrality”, but draws on the concept of a “mean-penalty-
preserving” adjustment of the monitoring/penalty parameters (i.e. probability of detection 
and size of penalty) developed in Fraser (2001b).   These three versions are considered in 
order  to  more  fully  evaluate  the  potential  for  targeting  to  alleviate  the  moral  hazard 
problem.  In Section 2 this model is analysed numerically and it is shown that although 
“resource-neutral” targeting can reduce the extent of cheating by those participants in the 
non-target group previously cheating, it cannot eliminate this propensity, and it may also 
encourage cheating by those in the non-target group previously behaving truthfully.  It is 
then  shown  that  with  “non-resource-neutral”  targeting  as  specified,  the  problem  of 
participants deciding to turn to cheating can be avoided.  However, using this approach it 
continues not to be possible to fully eliminate cheating among those participants in the 
non-target group cheating prior to the introduction of targeting.  Nevertheless, it shown 
that the introduction of the third version of targeting, “resource-neutral” with a “mean-
penalty-preserving”  adjustment  of  the  monitoring/penalty  parameters  for  those 
participants in the non-target group, is capable of eliminating all cheating.  Therefore, as 
argued in the Conclusion, although targeting has the potential to alleviate the moral hazard 
problem in agri-environmental policy, it will operate most effectively if coupled with appropriate 
adjustments to the monitoring/penalty parameters for those participants in the non-target group.   6 
SECTION 2: THE MODEL 
As stated in the Introduction, this section develops a model of an agent participating in an 
“agri-environmental” policy which requires an income-foregoing action on the part of the 
agent  in  return  for  a  payment.    In  addition,  the  principal  used  a  monitoring/penalty 
scheme to discourage moral hazard: taking the payment but not undertaking the action.  
Finally,  in  order  to  analyse  the  targeting  approach  outlined  in  the  Introduction  it  is 
necessary to specify an inter-temporal feature to the agent’s decision framework. 
 
In what follows the agent’s income in each period if behaving truthfully (IT) is known 
with certainty: 
 
   
IT    =  B - y + x  (1) 
         
where:   x > y 
 
  B  =  income if not participating 
 
  y  =  income forgone by participating 
 
  x  =  payment for participating 
 
Alternatively, if the agent chooses to cheat in each period then income (IC) is uncertain: 
 
Ic    =  B + x if not caught  (2) 
 
    =  B + (1 – ¶) x if caught 
 
where:  ¶    =  penalty parameter ³ 1 
 
Specifying the probability of detection in the absence of targeting as p, means that the 
expected utility from cheating in a period (EU(IC)) is given by: 
EU(IC)   =  (l – p) U(B + x) + p U(B+ (1-¶) x)  (3) 
 
where:  U(I)    =  utility of income (U' (I) > 0, U"(I) < 0) 
 
compared with the utility from behaving truthfully ((U(IT)) in a period: 
U(IT)    =  U(B – y + x)   (4) 
   7 
Therefore, for a two-period decision problem, the present value of expected utility from 
cheating in both periods (PVEU(IC12)) is given by: 
PVEU(IC12)  =  EU(IC) + EU(IC) / (1 + r)  (5) 
 
where:  r    =  discount rate, 
 
while for behaving truthfully in both periods: 
 
PVU(IT12)  =  U(IT) + U(IT) / (1 + r)  (6) 
 






<   PVEU(IC12)  (7) 
 
Note that in this situation the “mixed” strategy of cheating in one period and behaving 
truthfully  in  the  other  will  always  be  dominated  by  a  “pure”  strategy  of  cheating  or 
behaving truthfully in both periods.  This follows from the observation that, for example, 
if: 
EU(IC)   >  U(IT)  (8) 
 
then:   
 
PVEU(IC12))  > EU(IC)  + U(IT) /  (1 + r)   
 
> U(IT) + EU(IC) / (1+ r) > PVU(IT)  (9) 
 
with the reverse applying if: 
 
U(IT) > EU(IC)    (10) 
 
Next consider the introduction of targeting.  For the first version of “resource-neutral” 
targeting outlined is the Introduction, the higher probability of detection of those in the 
target group (pH) is achieved by shifting monitoring resources away from those in the 
non-target group, thus lowering this group’s probability of detection (pL).  It follows that:  
  pH  >  p  >  pL  (11)   
   8 
On the basis that the agent in question is not in the target group initially, but that if caught 
in the first period moves into the target group for the second period, the present value of 
expected utility from cheating in both periods is give by 
2 
PVEU(IC12))  =  (1- pL) U(B + x) + pL U(B + (1-¶) x)    
    + (pL(pH  U(B + ( 1-¶) x) + (1 – pH)  U(B + x)) 
    + (1 – pL) (pL  U(B + (1-¶) x) + (1 – pL)  U(B + x))) / (1 + r)  (12) 
In  addition, the present  value of expected utility  from behaving truthfully in the first 
period and cheating in the second (PVEU(IT1C2)) is given by
3: 
  PVEU(IT1C2)  =  U(IT) +   
        (pL  U(B + (1-¶) x) + (1 – pL)  U(B + x)) / (1 + r)  (13) 
In this situation the impact of the targeting on the present value of expected utility from 
cheating in both periods may be positive or negative depending on the values of pL and 
pH.   In particular, because pL < p the first term on the right-hand side of (12) is clearly 
higher that the first term on the right-hand-side of (5).  However the impact on the second 
term on the right-hand-side of (12) may be positive or negative.  Nevertheless, the aim of 
the principal will be for the overall impact of introducing targeting to be a decrease in 
(12) relative to (5), so that an agent who is the absence of targeting was cheating in both 
periods would with the introduction of targeting find that (12) was smaller than (6) (the 
present value of behaving truthfully in both periods).  Note that the numerical analysis in 
the next section will illustrate how the principal’s objective can be achieved.  However, it 
can be seen from (13) that if in the absence of targeting cheating is preferred ((5) exceeds 
(6)),  then with the introduction of targeting, because pL < p, it follows that: 
  PVEU(IT1C2)  >  PVU(IT12)  (14)   
As a consequence, although as will be illustrated in the next section it is possible for the 
introduction of “resource-neutral” targeting to deter agents who were previously cheating   9 
in both periods from doing so, it is unambiguously the case that these agents will still find 
that the mixed strategy of cheating in one period is preferred to behaving truthfully in 
both periods.  Therefore, “resource-neutral” targeting can prevent “full-time” cheating, 
but not “part-time” cheating.  Moreover, in this context, it should be recognised that for 
an agent who in the absence of targeting chooses to behave truthfully in both periods (i.e. 
(6)) exceeds (5)),  because pL < p, the potential arises for: 
      pU(B + (1-¶) x) + (1 – p)  U(B + x) < U(B – y + x)  (15) 
but: 
      pL U(B + (1-¶) x) + (1 – pL)  U(B + x) >  U(B – y + x)  (16) 
in which case:  
  PVEU(IT1C2)  >  PVU(IT12)  (17)   
In other words, the lower probability of detection associated with being in the non-target 
group may be sufficient to entice a previously truthful  agent to adopt the mixed  strategy 
of cheating in one period.  In the numerical analysis of the next section, this potential for 
the  introduction  of  “resource-neutral”  targeting  to  induce  “part-time”  cheating  among 
those previously behaving truthfully at all times is illustrated. 
 
Therefore it would seem that the “resource-neutral” form of targeting features two major 
failings  in  its  attempt  to  deter  non-target  group  participants  from  cheating:  it  doesn’t 
discourage cheating completely by those previously  cheating all the time; and it may 
encourage those previously behaving truthfully all the time to begin cheating some of the 
time. 
 
In an attempt to improve the performance of targeting, consider the second version, “non-
resource-neutral”  targeting,  proposed  in  the  Introduction.    In  this  case  the  principal   10 
devotes additional monitoring resources to the targeting activity in order to maintain the 
probability  of  detection  in  the  non-target  group  at  the  level  prevailing  prior  to  the 
introduction of targeting: 
pL   =  p    (18) 
It follows simply from (18) that if (15) holds, then the sign of (16) would be reversed, and 
so it is clearly the case that this form of targeting will not suffer from the failing of 
“resource-neutral”  targeting  of  enticing  those  agents  previously  behaving  truthfully  to 
start cheating.  However, for those previously cheating (i.e. (5) exceeds (6)), although the 
introduction of targeting may result in (12) being less than (6), so that behaving truthfully 
all the time is preferred to cheating all the time, it will still be the case that (14) holds, and 
the mixed strategy of cheating some of the time is preferred to behaving truthfully all the 
time.  Note this follows from observing that for these agents: 
EU(IC) > U(IT)     
prior to targeting, so that with p = pL  it will still hold subsequent to the introduction of 
targeting  for  those  in  the  non-target  group,  and  so  (13)  will  exceed  (6).    As  a 
consequence, even the more expensive "“non-resource-neutral" targeting will be unable to 
deter those agents previously cheating all the time from continuing to cheat some of the 
time. 
 
Therefore, in a final attempt to improve the performance of targeting, consider the third 
version proposed in the Introduction: that of “resource-neutral” targeting accompanied by 
appropriate “mean-penalty-preserving” adjustments in the monitoring/penalty parameters 
of the non-target group (i.e. pL and x) as outlined in Fraser (2001b).  Note at the outset 
that the aim of this version of targeting is to eliminate cheating completely, without either 
expending more resources on monitoring, or increasing the perception among non-target   11 
group participants of the expected penalty associated with cheating.  In other words, this 
version of targeting features neither more expensive monitoring, nor an adjustment in the 
expected cost of cheating among participants in the non-target group. More specifically, it 
must hold that the increased probability of detection in the target group is resourced by a 
decreased probability of detection in the non-target group: 
  pL  <  p  <  pH  (19)   
and that the expected cost of cheating among agents in the non-target group is unchanged: 
  p  ¶   X  =  pL  ¶ T  x    (20)   
where ¶ T  = new penalty parameter associated with targeting. 
 
On this basis, the present  value of expected utility from cheating all the time in the 
presence of targeting is given by: 
      PVEU(IC12) =   
      pL U(B + (1- T ¶ ) x) + (1 – pL)  U(B + x)  
      + (pL (pH U(B+ (1-¶ T) x) + (1 – pH ) U(B + x))  
      + (1-pL) (pL U(B + (1-¶ T) x) + (1 – pL)  U(B + x))) /(1+r)   (21)  
while the present value of expected utility from behaving truthfully in the first period and 
cheating in the second is given by: 
  PVEU(IT1C2)  >  U(IT) +      
  (
￿
L U(B + (1- T ¶ ) x) + (1 – 
￿
L)  U(B + x)) / (1+r)   (22) 
It will be shown using the numerical analysis of the next section how the principal can 
select the parameters pH, pL and  T ¶  so as to be consistent with the requirements of (19) 
and  (20)  regarding  monitoring  expense  and  the  expected  cost  of  cheating,  and  yet 
transform a situation prior to targeting of: 
  PVEU(IC12)  >  PVEU(IT1C2)  >  PVU(IT12)  (23)     12 
to one with the introduction of targeting of: 
  PVU(IT12)  >  PVEU(IT1C2)  >  PVEU(IC12))  (24)   
and in so doing  eliminate cheating  completely  by those participants in the non-target 
group.  Based on Fraser (2001b), it will also be shown how the key to this achievement is 
the adjustment of the monitoring/penalty parameters so as to increase the riskiness of 
cheating without affecting the expected penalty.  In this way, the risk aversion of the 
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SECTION 3:  NUMERICAL ANALYSIS 
In order to undertake a numerical analysis of the model developed in the previous section 
it is necessary to specify both a particular form for the agent’s utility function, and a set 
of parameter values to act as a Base Case.  In what follows the utility function is specified 
to take the constant relative risk aversion form
4: 








   (25) 
  where R  =  constant coefficient of relative risk aversion 
      =  U" (I ) . I / U'(I) 
In addition, the following parameter values are chosen for a Base Case: 
  B  =  20 
  y  =  10 
  x  =  18 
  ¶  =  1 
  r  =  0 
  p  =  0.5 
  R  =  0.5, 0.75 
  pL  =  0.4 
  pH  =  0.8 
On  this  basis  Table  1  contains  details  of  the  Base  Case  results  before  and  after  the 
introduction of  “resource-neutral” targeting for a participant in the non- target group.  
Note in this context that it has been assumed that the target group comprises 25% of 
participants so that an increase to 0.8  (i.e. pH =0.8)  in the probability of detection for this 
group can be achieved by a  reduction in the probability of detection of the non-target 
group  to 0.4 (i.e pL=0.4).    Note also that the penalty is such that the payment received 
by  the  agent    (x)  is  withdrawn  if  detected  cheating  (¶=1),  and  that  the  issue  of   14 
discounting has been overlooked for simplicity (r=0).  The results in Table 1 have been 
presented for non-target group participants with two levels of risk aversion (R=0.5, 0.75) 
in order to create a Base Case situation where in the absence of targeting one type of 
agent  (R=0.5) chooses to cheat all the time, while the other  (R=0.75) chooses to behave 
truthfully all the time.  In addition, as shown in Table 1, following the introduction of 
targeting the agent previously cheating all the time  (R=0.5) now finds that the mixed 
strategy of cheating some of the time becomes the preferred choice.  It should be noted at 
this point that in this example targeting also increases PVEU(IC12), but not by as much as 
PVEU(IT1C2) is increased.  Unreported numerical results show that if the target group is 
smaller (less than 20%) of all participants), so that the probability of detection is greater 
for this group (pH > 0.9) then the impact of targeting is to reduce PVEU(IC12)  below the 
level of PVU(IT12) for  non-target group participants.  Nevertheless, even in this case the 
mixed strategy of cheating some of the time dominates all others.  Therefore Table 1 
clearly illustrates the finding of the previous section that resource-neutral targeting will 
deter non-target group agents previously cheating all the time from this behaviour, but it 
will not deter them from cheating some of the time.  Moreover, as is shown in Table 1 for 
the  more  risk  averse  agent  (R=0.75),  targeting  may  encourage  non-target  group 
participants previously  behaving truthfully all the time to commence cheating some of 
the time  (PVEU(IT1C2 ) > PVU(IT12))
5. 
 
Consequently,  as suggested in Section 1, a modification to this targeting  approach is 
required if these incentive failings are to be remedied.  The first modification suggested 
in Section 1 was for extra monitoring resources to be spent with targeting to ensure that 
the increased probability of detection in the target group could be achieved without a   15 
reduction in the probability of detection among the non-target group.  In this numerical 
analysis this modification is equivalent to introducing targeting with pH = 0.8 and pL = p 
= 0.5.  Table 2 contains details of the impact of this modification on the Base Case 
results.  The results in Table 2 show that, as indicated in Section 1, such a  modification 
would be able to prevent  targeting  enticing  those non-target group agents previously 
behaving  truthfully  all  the  time    (R=0.75)    to  begin  cheating  some  of  the  time.    
However, for those non-target group agents previously cheating all the time (R=0.5), 
with targeting it remains the case that cheating some of the time is preferred.   
 
On this basis, an alternative modification was proposed in the Introduction which remains 
resource-neutral,  but  which  features  a  mean-penalty  preserving  adjustment  of  the 
monitoring/penalty parameters for the non-target group, and which aims to deter those in 
the non-target group who were previously cheating all the time from  doing so at all in the 
presence of  targeting.  More specifically, consider an increase  in ¶ from 1 to (¶ T = 1.25) 
which leaves the expected cost of cheating unchanged for those in the non-target group: 
¶p x   =  ¶ T  pL  x  =  9  (26) 
Table 3 contains details of the impact of this modification to resource-neutral targeting on 
the Base Case results. The results in this table illustrate the potential for the proposed 
modification to targeting to achieve a complete elimination of cheating among non-target 
group participants and in particular among those participants who prior to targeting were 
cheating  all  the  time,  and  who  with  the  previous    two  approaches  to  targeting  still 
preferred to cheat some of the time (R=0.5).   Moreover, as indicated in Section 1, this 
elimination of the cheating incentive is not achieved by increasing either the resources 
expended on monitoring or the expected cost of cheating.  Rather it is based on increasing   16 
the riskiness of cheating combined with the aversion to this increase stemming from the 
agent’s attitude to risk.  More specifically, the increase  in the riskiness of  cheating 
associated with the increase in ¶ (and the decrease of p to pL) reduces the expected utility 
from cheating not only all the time (see equation (12)) but even some of the time (see 
equation  (13)),  and  so  for  a  sufficient  increase  in  this  risk  combined  with  the    risk 
aversion  of the agent, the choice of behaving truthfully  all the time can be made the 
preferred option.   17 
CONCLUSION 
The concept of targeting in the context of monitoring/penalty systems involves separating 
the  system’s    participants  into  a  (larger)  non-target  and  a  (smaller)  target  group  and 
increasing the probability of detection of those in the target group.   The aim of this paper 
has been to explore the potential for targeting to be used to alleviate the moral hazard 
problem  in  the  context  of  agri-environmental  schemes  because  it  is  relatively 
straightforward  to separate participants in such schemes based on geographical location, 
and  because  of  the  perceived  benefits  of  targeting  specific  sources  of  environmental  
damage.   The particular focus of the paper has been on the scope for using targeting to 
reduce the frequency of cheating among those participants  in the non-target group, rather 
than the more straightforward case of those targeted participants. 
 
In Section 1 of the paper an intertemporal model of an agent participating in an agri-
environmental scheme was developed.  Participation required the agent to take action to 
forego  income  in  return  for  a  payment,  thereby  creating  the  incentive    to  cheat  by 
receiving  the  payment  but  not  taking  the  action.    Hence,  the  principal  uses  a 
monitoring/penalty  system  to  discourage  cheating.    Within  this  model  context  three 
alternative approaches to targeting were analysed.  First, a resource-neutral approach was 
considered whereby the extra  monitoring resources needed to increase the probability of 
detection in the target group were taken from those used for monitoring the non-target 
group, thereby decreasing the probability of detection in the non-target group.  It was 
shown in Section 1, and subsequently illustrated in the numerical analysis of Section 2, 
that this approach can reduce the frequency of but not eliminate cheating among those in 
the non-target group who cheated all the time in the absence of targeting.  Moreover,   18 
because this approach reduces the probability of detection for those in the non-target 
group it was shown that those in this group, who in the absence of targeting did not cheat 
at all, may as a consequence of this form of targeting be enticed to cheat some of the 
time.  Consequently, two alternative forms of targeting were considered in an attempt to 
eliminate these weaknesses  in the first approach.   The non-resource–neutral alternative 
involved  increasing  expenditure    on  monitoring  resources  in  order  to  restore  the 
probability of detection  within the non-target group.  It was shown in the numerical 
analysis  of Section 2 how this approach could eliminate the propensity within the first 
approach to entice those previously not cheating at all to begin cheating some of the time 
in the presence of targeting.  However, it was also demonstrated in Section 1 that this 
approach could not eliminate the preference of those previously cheating all the time to 
still cheat some of the time even in the presence of targeting.  Therefore, the concept of a 
mean-penalty preserving increase in the riskiness of cheating developed in Fraser (2001b) 
was incorporated to create a third form of targeting.  This form was specified neither to 
expend more monitoring resources (resource-neutral) , nor to increase the expected cost 
of  cheating  for  those  in  the  non-target  group  (mean-penalty  preserving),  but  by 
appropriate adjustments in the monitoring/penalty parameters this approach was able to 
eliminate completely cheating by those participants in the non-target group.  In particular, 
it was shown using the numerical analysis of Section 2 that by increasing the riskiness of 
cheating, the attraction of so doing to risk averse agents was able to be reduced to the 
point where behaving truthfully all the time was the preferred option. 
 
On this basis it may be concluded that targeting has the potential to alleviate the moral 
hazard problem in agri-environmental schemes, but that in order to be most effective it   19 
needs to be coupled with adjustments in the monitoring/penalty parameters which deter 
risk aware agents in the non-target group from cheating.  
 
   20 
REFERENCES 
1.  Australian Taxation Office (2001), www.ato.gov.au, “Audit Statistical Sampling 
Guidelines”. 
 
2.  Breautigam, R.R. and Panzar, J.C. (1993( “Effects of the change from rate-of-
return  to  price-cap  regulation”  American  Economic  Review  (Papers  and 
Proceedings) 83(2): 191-98. 
 
3.  Choe, C. and Fraser, I. (1999) “Compliance monitoring and agri-environmental 
policy” Journal of Agricultural Economics 50(3): 468-87. 
 
4.  Fraser R.W. (2001a) “Using principal-agent theory to deal with output slippage in 
the European Union set-aside policy” Journal of Agricultural Economics 52 (2): 
29-41. 
 
5.  Fraser R.W. (2001b) “Moral hazard and risk management in agri-environmental 
policy” Paper presented to the Annual Conference of the Agricultural Economics 
Society, Harper Adams College, September. 
 
6.  Fraser,  R.W.  and  Rygnestad,  H.L.  (1999)  “An  assessment  of  the  impact  of 
implementing  the  European  Commission’s  Agenda  2000  cereal  proposals  for 
specialist wheatgrowers in Denmark” Journal of Agricultural Economics 50(2): 
328-35. 
   21 
7.  Hogan, T., Ozanne, A. and Colman, D. (2000) “Modelling moral hazard in agri-
environmental  policy:  the  case  of  standard  fixed  contract  payments”.    Paper 
presented  to  the  Annual  Conference  of  the  Agricultural  Economics  Society, 
University of Manchester, March. 
 
8.  Latacz-Lohmann,  U.  (1998)  “Moral  hazard  in  agri-environmental  schemes”.  
Paper presented to the Annual Conference of the Agricultural Economics Society, 
University of Reading, March. 
 
9.  Moxey, A., White, B. and Ozanne, A. (1999), “Efficient contract design for agri-
environmental policy” Journal of Agricultural Economics 50(2): 187-202. 
 
10.  Polinsky,  M.  and  Shavell,  S.  (1979)  “The  optimal  trade-off  between  the 
probability and magnitude of fines” American Economic Review 69(5): 880-91. 
 
11.  Pope, R.D. and Just, R.E. (1991) “On testing the structure of risk preferences in 
agricultural supply analysis” American Journal of Agricultural Economics 73(3): 
743-8. 





Base Case Results Before and  
After the Introduction of Resource-Neutral Targeting  
 
  R 
  0.5  0.75 
No Targeting     
PVU(IT12)      21.17  18.41 
PVEU(IC12)      21.27       18.39 
PVEU(IT1C2)      21.22       18.40 
 
 
   
Targeting     
PVU(IT12)      21.17  18.41 
PVEU(IC12)      21.41       18.45 
PVEU(IT1C2)      21.56       18.54 










Comparison of Resource-Neutral and  
Non-Resource-Neutral Targeting  
 
  R 
  0.5  0.75 
Resource-Neutral 
pL = 0.4; pH = 0.8 
 
PVU(IT12)      21.17      18.41 
PVEU(IC12)      21.41        18.45 
PVEU(IT1C2)      21.56        18.54 
 
 
   
Non-Resource Neutral 
pL = 0.5; pH = 0.8 
   
PVU(IT12)      21.17      18.41 
PVEU(IC12)      20.77        18.17 
PVEU(IT1C2)      21.22        18.40 





Comparison of Resource-Neutral and  
Penalty-adjusted Resource-Neutral Targeting  
 
  R 
  0.5  0.75 
Resource-Neutral 
pL = 0.4;   ¶ = 1 
 
PVU(IT12)      21.17      18.41 
PVEU(IC12)      21.41        18.45 
PVEU(IT1C2)      21.56        18.54 
 
 




pL = 0.4;  ¶  = 1.25 
   
PVU(IT12)      21.17      18.41 
PVEU(IC12)      20.38        17.95 
PVEU(IT1C2)      21.13        18.34 
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2   Note that the analysis of targeting for agents who start in the target group is a 
 
straightforward problem to consider and is omitted in what follows.  Note also that  
 




3  Note that the alternative mixed strategy of cheating in the first period and  
 
behaving truthfully in the second yields similar findings and so for simplicity is  
 








5   Once again, if the target group is smaller and pH higher then this type of agent  
 
would still prefer behaving truthfully all the time to cheating all the time, but both  
 
are dominated by the mixed strategy. 